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The Cult of Theoi: Economic Uncertainty and Religion
* 
 
Sacrifices to deities occur in nearly all known religions. In this paper, we report on our 
attempts to elicit this type of religious behaviour towards “Theoi” in the laboratory. The theory 
we test is that, when faced with uncertainty, individuals attempt to engage in a reciprocal 
contract with the source of uncertainty by sacrificing towards it. In our experiments, we create 
the situation whereby individuals face an uncertain economic payback due to “Theoi” and we 
allow participants to sacrifice towards this entity. Aggregate sacrifices amongst participants 
are over 30% of all takings, increase with the level of humanistic labelling of Theoi and 
decrease when participants share information or when the level of uncertainty is lower. The 
findings imply that under circumstances of high uncertainty people are willing to sacrifice 
large portions of their income even when this has no discernable effect on outcomes. 
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we report on a set of experiments designed to mimic a core aspect of nearly all 
known religions: sacrifices to a deity. In modern religions, the sacrifices take the form of 
prayer or adherence to religious doctrine. Extreme forms include the sacrifice of one‟s life. 
Historically,  sacrifices  took  many  forms.  The  Ancient  Greeks  burnt  pieces  of  beef  as  a 
sacrifice to the gods they wished to please (Bremmer 2007; Mikalson 2005; Price & Kearns 
2003). The Romans sacrificed fruit, cakes, wine, cattle and other domestic animals (Warrior 
2006; Scheid 2003, 2007). Asking to inspire and protect their warriors, water the corn fields 
and protect long-distance traders, the Mayas sacrificed humans, weapons and gold ornaments 
by putting them into the waters of a deep sinkhole (Cogins 1992; Pringle 2008). In China, a 
similar ceremony of ancestor worship can still be observed where individuals burn paper 
money in the belief that this avoids calamities and leads to prosperity (Addison 1924; Gates 
1987). 
We take the religious beliefs at face value and wonder what the common economic rationale 
is, i.e. what would a selfish person need to believe to sacrifice to a deity?  This question 
squarely tackles the challenge laid down by Iannaconne (1998) for economic stories about the 
content of religions to be based on „rational‟ choice. Our hypothesis then,  is that gods and 
spirits symbolise some source of uncertainty that matters to people and that these sacrifices 
are made in the hope of a return favour. This closely mirrors the classic argument by Azzi and 
Ehrenberg  (1975)  that  religiosity  is  mainly  about  investments  in  the  afterlife,  implicitly 
presuming that individuals believe the afterlife gets better when more prior investments are 
made. In the above examples of Roman antiquity, Greek antiquity, Mayan civilisation and 
modern China these bargains were explicit: sacrifices were made in order to secure a good 
harvest, fertility, luck in battle, etc. In the two biggest current religions, modern Christianity 
and Islam, the vast majority of the adherents of these faiths bargain over life after death; those 
who behave well go to heaven, those who do not go to hell. In mainstream Buddhism and 
Hinduism (the next biggest religions), those who lead a good life go up in the hierarchy of 3 
 
animals and castes, and those who lead a bad life lose status in the hierarchy. The explicit 
economic theme in these cases is the reciprocity of the unknown.  
It  is  tempting  to  see  the  same  mechanism  outside  of  recognised  religion  in  the  secular 
spending programs of today, each with their associated industry beneficiaries: by spending 
vast amounts of money on X our societies hope to ward off the problems associated with X 
without ever really finding out if the sacrifice helped. Depending on one‟s political beliefs, 
one might want to replace X with „climate change‟, „killer asteroids‟, „health‟, or „terrorism‟ 
(Frey 2004). 
The societal cost of sacrifices is not just the sacrifice itself. The existence of sacrifices attracts 
religious  interpreters  who  derive  influence  and  wealth  from  their  status  as  intermediaries 
between the deity and the agent, which itself can lead to an entrenched religious class (Stark, 
Iannaccone & Finke 1996; Stark 1999; Dennett 2006; Newberg & Lee 2005).  
Psychologists have recently argued that our ability to believe in and have human relationships 
with abstract entities conveys a great evolutionary advantage because it allows us to believe in 
shared  group  identities  and  group  goals  (Boyer  2008;  Burkert  1983;  Wilson  2002).  Our 
abstractive  abilities  would  create  deities  out  of  real-life  economic  uncertainty,  whilst  our 
ability to humanise these abstractions would allow individuals to believe deities are reciprocal 
(Fehr & Gätcher 2000). This theory, which we explicitly test, yields an indirect evolutionary 
rationale for sacrifices.  
To validate our hypothesis we create a situation where individuals face a source of economic 
uncertainty about which they are fundamentally ignorant. We then allow them to decide how 
much they wish to sacrifice to the uncertainty, termed „Theoi, the market maker‟, where in 
each case the truth is that there is no  relationship between the amount sacrificed and the 
ensuing realisation of the uncertainty. By physically separating the individuals from their 4 
 
group and by reducing their interactions with actual persons to anonymous interactions, we 
ensure that the only gain from sacrificing would be favourable choices by the unknown.  
We then run experiments with reduced or no uncertainty, where individuals can still make 
sacrifices,  in  order to  see  if it is  truly the uncertainty that  leads  to  sacrifices  or whether 
sacrifices are made for other reasons like a personal emotional gain involved in the act of 
worship ( Dennett 2006; Newberg & Lee 2005). In such a case uncertainty should not matter. 
In a second variation we change the labelling of the uncertainty from „Theoi‟ to „The weather‟ 
in order to see if anthropomorphism of the unknown mattered to the emergence of sacrifices 
(Boyer  2008).  We  finally  allow  participants  to  share  information  to  see  whether  more 
opportunities to learn about the unknown induce lower levels of sacrifices.  
Throughout, we will be mindful of the fact that one can interpret all the results in the context 
of a learning model in which individuals gradually learn, over time, the decision rule of the 
unknown Theoi entity. Within a learning context, our hypothesis is that individuals have a 
strong prior that the unknown behaves reciprocally and we would thus expect high initial 
sacrifices which reduce only slowly over time. The faster the sacrifices reduce the weaker the 
prior belief was and thus the weaker the overall tendency to sacrifice to the unknown. 
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In the next section we review the recent economic 
literature  on  religion  and  the  contribution  of  this  paper  therein.  In  the  third  section  we 
describe the baseline experiment, its main variations and the general story that emerges from 
them. In the fourth section we then use the data on the individual levels of sacrifices to look at 
the individual determinants of sacrifices and the most plausible learning model associated 
with different set-ups. The final section concludes. 5 
 
 
2.  The Economic literature on religion and sacrifices 
The economics of religion can be organised around four main questions: who engages in 
religious  activities
1? What are the costs and benefits of religion
2? How is the market for 
religion organised
3? And why do people believe what they believe? Our paper fits mainly into 
this last question. 
  2.1 Why do people believe what they believe? 
The economic literature has produced few causal stories about the origin of actual religious 
beliefs. The main one is that there is an actual economic benefit to particular beliefs. The 
Benabou and Tirole‟s (2004) model takes religious beliefs to be pre-commitment devices in 
multi-time period models with mentally weak agents. The basic structure of their model is 
that individuals are fully rational in some initial period where these individuals know that in 
future  periods  they  will  not  be  able  to  choose  optimally  without  some  pre-commitment 
(because  of  imperfect  memories,  hyperbolic  discounting,  or  a  variety  of  other  cognitive 
biases). Individuals can then choose in the initial period to believe in an afterlife that demands 
high work effort in the second period. Individuals in the second period then indeed truly 
believe in an afterlife and act as if they believe it. Added to this actual material self-interest of 
a  belief  is  Benabou  and  Tirole‟s  (2006)  assertion  that  individuals  are  naturally  prone  to 
believe in the inherent justness of the world: „the nearly universal human tendency to want to 
                                                 
1 Iannaconne (1998); Guiso et al. (2005).  
2 Azzi and Ehrenberg‟s (1975); Gruber and Hungerman (2006); Iannaconne (1998); Iannaconne and Berman 
(2006); Guiso et al. (2005); Gruber (2005); Tan and Vogel (2008); Hilary and Hui (2009); Noland (2005); 
Becker and Wossman (2009); Ahmed and Salas (2009);  
3 Iannaconne and Berman (2006); Frey and Stutzer (2004); Ekelund (1996); Barros and Garoupa (2002); 
Hungerman (2005); Oslington (2003). 6 
 
believe that the world is just in the sense that people generally get what they deserve. Many 
experiments thus show how individuals systematically construe what they observe so as to 
preserve this belief – ignoring, distorting, forgetting or explaining away any information that 
threatens it‟. This might also be interpreted as an inherent belief in the reciprocity of the 
unknown. In a way, our experiments try to find the mechanisms for this belief. 
In a very similar vein of looking for pre-commitment benefits of religion, Blum and Dudley 
(2001) argue that the theory of predestination in Protestantism leads individuals to be more 
trustworthy, which they argue is particularly important for network-based economic growth 
such  as  small-scale  commerce  and  industry  in  the  Northern  Europe  of  the  18
th  and  19
th 
century. Again, this is a view of religious beliefs as being either the result of or at least 
perpetuated by economic incentives, echoing the opinions of Lewis (1955) who saw religious 
content as „probably‟ being ultimately driven by economic forces. 
Caplan (2001) interprets the contents of religious beliefs (and various other beliefs) as being 
mainly a matter of choice and dependent on proclivities which he doesn‟t further analyse or 
expand upon. He analyses how it is possible that people believe things that are mutually 
inconsistent. Individuals in his story choose their „bliss belief‟ because there are almost no 
private costs for them if they are wrong and hence there is no incentive to believe anything 
more  rational.  They  are  thus  rationally  irrational.  Caplan  detects  this  phenomenon  in  the 
prejudices of juries, in the political beliefs of the US population and in religious beliefs. A 
particular  aspect  of  Caplan‟s  view  of  beliefs  is  that  his  agents  hold  these  with  absolute 
certainty  (and  claim  to  do  so  in  surveys),  easily  ignoring  or  disregarding  mountains  of 
contrary evidence. Yet they are able to temporarily suspend their religious beliefs as soon as 
their true private interests would be threatened by the logical consequences of these beliefs. 
Witness in this regard the observation of Mosca (1939) which Caplan quotes approvingly: 
 7 
 
„Mohammed, for instance, promises paradise to all who fall in a holy war. Now if 
every believer were to guide his conduct by that assurance in the Koran, every 
time a Mohammeddan army found itself faced by unbelievers it ought either to 
conquer or to fall to the last man. It cannot be denied that a certain number of 
individuals do live up to the letter of the Prophet‟s word, but as between defeat 
and death followed by eternal bliss, the majority of Mohammedans normally elect 
defeat‟ (Mosca 1939, 181-182) 
 
Both Mosca and Caplan maintain that the majority of the population have only superficial 
faith in what they profess to believe, whilst „a minority of adherents can pressure others into 
pretending to share their view‟. Note that if this interpretation of religious beliefs is correct, as 
soon as individuals are faced with the true private costs of their beliefs they should revert to 
more rational actions, i.e. few „really‟ believe and hence few should sacrifice anything if they 
know no-one else is watching, which is counter to what we expect to see in our experiments.  
Finally, Iannaconne and Berman (2006) propose a very definite theory of the existence of 
sacrifices that is perpendicular, though not mutually exclusive, to our story. In their view, 
sacrifices are a means of „screening out half-hearted members and inducing higher levels of 
participation  amongst  those  who  remain‟.  Iannaconne  and  Berman  (2006)  thus  interpret 
sacrifices as being enforced by religious entrepreneurs as an entry barrier into sects that offer 
a package of goods, including religious and public goods, to small communities whose public 
goods are not met by secular authorities. Our argument, that sacrifices are driven by economic 
uncertainty and can exist at the individual level without any religious community because 
they correspond to in-built human psychological traits, leads to falsifiable predictions not 
present in the argument of Iannaconne and Berman (2006). According to our theory, the level 
of sacrifices should go up with the level of uncertainty, a prediction not generated by the 
community-based story of Iannaconne and Berman (2006). 8 
 
3.  A descriptive economic framework for sacrifices 
We envisage the utility function of participant i when dealing with the unknown (Theoi) to be 
purely guided by material self-interest, i.e. the participant maximizes 
 
Here s denotes the level of sacrifice, xi denotes the number of goods initially available, and 
() Theoi ps is the price Theoi decides upon as a function of s. The important part here is the 
beliefs an individual has about the utility function of Theoi. Allowing for the notion that 
Theoi  is  inherently  reciprocal  with  unknown  strength,  we  envisage  the  following  general 
presumed utility function of Theoi: 
 
Where c is the marginal cost to Theoi of giving a high level of prices (this need not mean that 
the  unknown  has  a  marginal  value  of  effort;  it  could  simply  be  the  shadow  price  of  the 
reputation of the unknown for being hard to please), and f(.) is presumed to be concave, 
capturing the notion of reciprocity. This leads to an optimal choice by Theoi equal to 
 
Conversely,  this  means  an  individual‟s  optimal  choice  of  s  (conditional  on  expecting  a 
positive price) would be  
1 ' ( )
max{0, }
2





Which implicitly makes s increasing in c and increasing in b. One can think of many learning 
strategies that individuals may have concerning c, b, and f(.), and one can think of many 
extensions  to  this  believed  utility  function.  We  will  simply  note  that  should  individuals 
believe  b  to  be  zero  or  even  negative,  i.e.  the  unknown  is  not  reciprocal  at  all,  then  an 
( ) ( )* ( ) s i i Theoi Max E U x s p s 
* ( * ) Theoi Theoi Theoi U s c p f p b s    
(0,arg { '( * )}) Theoi p p Max c f p b s   9 
 
individual‟s optimal choice of s would be zero. We will interpret a high and persistent level of 
s as a strong belief that the unknown is reciprocal
4, whilst we will interpret fast declines in s 
as evidence that individuals quickly learn about the actual utility function of the unknown and 
thus only hold their initial beliefs very weakly. 
 
4.  The experiments 
In  total  we  had  393  students  from  the  Queensland  University  of  Technology,  Australia, 
participate in 25 sessions during which they were anonymous to each other. In order to ensure 
the students had no prior interaction and that we were not picking up some peculiarity of a 
specific discipline, students were deliberately taken from a variety of disciplines, including 
accounting,  finance,  economics,  business,  information  technology,  engineering  and 
architecture. 
Each experiment consisted of 20 rounds of play, with a minimum of 9 and a maximum of 19 
participants.  In each round of play, participants  earned money,  where they received their 
cumulative winnings at the end of the experiment. The average length of a session was around 
50  minutes,  and  the  average  amount  paid  was  23.96  Australian  dollars,  about  twice  the 
                                                 
4 An observationally equivalent way to interpret this set-up is to think of this situation in terms of „Pascal‟s 
wager‟, which denotes the idea that an individual chooses to follow the strictures of a religion on the off-chance 
that  it  might  be  true.  The  key  element  within  „Pascal‟s  wager‟  that  makes  a  person  sacrifice  is  that  the 
hypothesised believed deity actually cares about sacrifices (rather than anything of a thousand other actions one 
might  hypothesise  a  deity  cares  about).  Within  our  set-up  Pascal‟s  wager  can  simply  be  understood  as 
uncertainty about the elements of Theoi‟s decision function, but where one would still need a prior belief in the 
reciprocity of the deity in order to rationalise sacrifices. 10 
 
minimum  wage  in  Australia.  The  experiment  was  programmed  and  conducted  with  the 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).   
In the baseline experiment each round consisted of two phases: (i) a standard public good 
game  with  a  Voluntary  Contribution  Mechanism,  and  (ii)  the  sacrifice  towards  the 
uncertainty. At the start of Phase I, each individual was given 100 tokens. Participants were 
told that these represent units of a good. They were given the opportunity to invest between 0 
and 100 units to a group project. The total amount invested by the group was multiplied by 
1.6 and then divided equally among the group members regardless of individual contributions. 
Each participant‟s total holdings of the good at the end of Phase I was obtained by adding up 
the units they get from the group project (net of their individual investment) to the units they 
chose not to invest. The optimal joint outcome was for each participant to invest 100, in 
which case each gets back 160. The optimal outcome for a selfish individual arose if the 
others contributed a 100 and he contributed nothing. 
At the end of Phase I, each individual would have a positive amount of units of the good. In 
Phase II (the sacrifice towards uncertainty), each individual was told that “Theoi”, „the market 
Maker‟, decides on the actual monetary value of the good earned in Phase I. Participants were 
deliberately kept  ignorant  about  Theoi‟s decision rule and were simply told that the way 
Theoi decides is unknown. Participants were then given the option to „contribute‟ any number 
of  units  of  the  good  between  0  and  what  they  earned  in  Phase  I  to  Theoi.
5  After this 
                                                 
5 The use of the word „contribute‟ is deliberate. Alternative wordings could have been „sacrifice‟, „allocate‟, 
„give‟, etc. The choice of the word „contribute‟ is because of its multi-interpretable nature, i.e. it is possible to 
„contribute‟ to something whilst either expecting something in return or not expecting something in return. To 
„give‟ would usually imply expecting no reward, whilst to „allocate‟ is a word with the same ambiguity as 
„contribute‟ („to allocate‟ can mean both „to invest‟ or „to give‟) but as a word is infrequently used amongst non-
economist. Whilst the direct use of the word „sacrifice‟ would also allow ambiguity, it would naturally be 
interpreted within a scientific experiment setting as „give away whilst expecting nothing in return‟.  11 
 
contribution they were informed about the monetary value of the good as decided by Theoi 
and  their  total  income  for  the  round.  Their  total  income  for  the  round  (in  experimental 
currency units, ECU) was calculated as Phase I units of the good (net of the units sacrificed to 
Theoi) times the unit value of the good determined by Theoi. ECUs were converted to real 
(Australian) dollars using an exchange rate of 1 dollar for each 100 ECUs. After recording 
this value, a new round would begin. 
In the baseline experiment the actual decision rule Theoi follows was entirely random as it 
equalled  )     1 , 0 max(   shock group shock individual Value Unit    . In this expression both the 
individual  shock  and  the  group  shock  are  distributed  uniformly  on  the  ( -1,1)  interval. 
Furthermore, the group shocks in periods 5, 10, and 15 were rigged to be particularly negative 
in  that  the  group  shocks  were  put  at -0.5  in  those  periods.  We  deliberately  used  both 
individual and group shocks to make it difficult for the participants to work out (after the 
experiments) what the precise mechanism would have been, yet simple enough so that they 
could reasonably learn within 20 periods that their sacrifices had no effect on Theoi.  
Phase I of each round was mainly intended to give the participants a sense of ownership over 
the money they play with in Phase II. Phase I could in principle be replaced by any other 
standard  economic  game  that  involves  reciprocity  or  altruism  (Güth,  Schmittberger  & 
Schwarze 1982; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003; Andreoni, Harbaugh & Vesterlund 2008) and our 
choice of Phase I was mainly predicated by a desire to be able to compare some aspects of our 
experiment to existing literature. An important robustness check was to replace Phase I by a 
math test in which individuals could earn goods. 
In total, 56 individuals participated in the baseline experiment. The level invested in Phase I 
was very similar to that found in other countries (Figure 1, panel a). The average percentage 
investment of 34.9% in these experiments compares to positive contributions to the public 
good  found  in  similar  studies  (Ledyard  195;  Keser  &  van  Winden  2000;  Croson  2008). 
Another  standard  finding  was  that,  given  that  there  is  no  enforcement  mechanism,  the 12 
 
contribution to the public good generally declined over time as individuals behaved more 
selfishly (Fehr & Gätcher 2000, 2000, 2003). These standard results mean there was nothing 
overtly strange about our pool of participants. 
Figure 1 (panel b) shows the results of Phase II, the average proportion of units earned in 
Phase  I  sacrificed  to  Theoi.  What  is  striking  is  the  very  high  levels  of  sacrifices  made: 
individuals started off sacrificing about half their winning to the source of uncertainty, almost 
as if they were sharing 50-50 with the unknown entity. The level sacrificed dropped over 
time, but was not significantly lower after 18 periods ( 33 . 0  mean ,  31 . 0  SD ) than after 8 
( 26 . 0  mean ,  24 . 0  SD ;  32 . 1 ) 110 (   t ,  19 . 0  P ). Rather, it hovered between 23% and 
33% with an average for the last five periods of 27.3% (clustered  027 . 0  SE ). Hence even in 
the  long  run,  considering  all  20  rounds,  individuals  on  average  sacrificed  around  30.0%  
( 025 . 0  SE ) of what they obtained in Phase I. If we disaggregate this, we find that in the last 
five periods, 92.9% (or 52 out of 56) of participants sacrificed on average a positive amount, 
with 69.6% sacrificing more than 10% on average of their Phase I winnings in the last five 
periods. 
The sacrificial behaviour following the negative aggregate shocks of period 5, 10, and 15 do 
not follow any discernible trend; aggregate sacrifices dropped between period 5 and 7, whilst 
they increased between period 15 and 17. 
Table 1 describes the results of the baseline experiment and that of all the 3 different main 
treatments.  We  will  discuss  these  different  treatments  that  are  important  to  our  main 
argument, and then quickly discuss the other, more robustness oriented treatments. 13 
 
4.1 Do you really need uncertainty to see sacrifices? 
Our first set of additional experiments was designed to test whether uncertainty truly is a 
crucial step to get sustained high sacrifices. In the first set of alternative treatments, applied to 
65 participants in three sessions, we re-ran the baseline experiments without any uncertainty, 
that is, we made the unit value always equal to 1 (see treatment 2 in Table 1). The results for 
Phase I were once again standard and not shown here. The results for Phase II are in Figure 2 
which shows the levels of sacrifices for the baseline experiment and the no-uncertainty case.  
Amongst the no-uncertainty group, the aggregate level of sacrifice in the last five periods was 
only  7.36%  ( 016 . 0  SE ),  which  was  one-fourth  of  that  in  the  baseline  experiment  with 
uncertainty ( % 3 . 27  mean  ,  027 . 0  SE ). The p-value for a test of means in each period 
rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of these means in all last 5 periods at the 5% level of 
significance. Hence,  whilst a small number of participants kept sacrificing something, the 
participants were clearly not just sacrificing because the option to do so existed. The majority 
clearly did learn that the unknown was not reciprocal. One might think that those who still 
contributed  positively  never  varied  their  sacrifice  and  hence  did  not  have  time  to  learn. 
However, this is not the case because no individual sacrificed the same amount in all 20 
periods. Whilst only 25 out of 65 sacrificed more in the last 5 periods than a minimal amount 
(more than 2%), these 25 individuals on aggregate sacrificed some 18.5% of their takings on 
average, which does not significantly differ from the sacrifices in the baseline experiment. 
The fact that some individuals seem impervious to feed-back when it comes to sacrificing is 
commensurate with hypotheses about of the existence of „types‟ of individuals who differ in 
their level of reciprocity behaviour (Fehr & Gätcher 2000).  
4.2 Does the uncertainty need a human name to sustain sacrifices? 
A further hypothesis we wished to test is whether it matters how we label the source of 
uncertainty. Our working assumption was that giving a human name (Theoi) to the source of 
uncertainty would elicit higher sacrificial behaviour than if we would adopt a labelling that, 14 
 
within the culture of Australia, would be associated with something usually outside the sphere 
of influence of individuals. To this end, we performed experiments with 32 participants (in 2 
sessions) where the name Theoi was substituted by „the weather‟. Participants were told that 
the weather was responsible for the unit values and that it was unknown how the weather 
affected the unit value  of the  good. Otherwise, the parameters were exactly equal  to  the 
baseline experiment (see Table 1, treatment 3). Once again, the level of contribution to the 
public good was standard so we do not show them here. 
Phase II results are consistent with our working hypothesis that labelling matters (Figure 3). 
The initial level of sacrifice was similar ( 373 . 0  mean ,  249 . 0  SD ) to the initial level of the 
baseline experiment ( 389 . 0  mean , 297 . 0  SD ;  0.280 ) 86 (   t ,  790 . 0  P ), and dropped 
till  an  average  of  0.187  (clustered  025 . 0  SE ) in  the  last  five  periods,  which  is  about  a 
quarter  lower  than  that  of  the  baseline  experiment 
( 273 . 0  mean , 027 . 0  SD ; 13 . 2 ) 86 (  t , 036 . 0  P ). Interestingly, in these experiments only 
37.5% of individuals sacrificed less than 10% on average in the last five periods. 
We might mention that these results also show that it is not just learning that is going on in 
these experiments: because the actual pay-off rule is exactly the same in this experiment as in 
the baseline, the learning effect should also be the same. Rather, the labelling itself affects the 
prior belief about the actions of the unknown.  
4.3 Does more information break religion? 
The final hypothesis we examined was that the level of sacrifices would reduce if individuals 
were  given  more  information  about  the  level  of  sacrifices  and  the  unit  values  of  other 
participants (see Table 1, treatment 4). A key question was whether some individuals would 
ignore the information and sacrifice anyway or whether all the participants would take the 
opportunity to learn from other decisions Theoi made. 15 
 
To this end, we gave all participants in Phase II of each round the option to reveal their Phase 
I sacrifice to  Theoi  as  well as  the unit value they  were then hit by  (53 individuals  in  3 
sessions). On average, 64.3% of participants in each round shared information, increasing 
from 56.6% in the first round to 66.0% in the last round. These sessions lasted slightly longer 
than an hour, as some participants spent extra time analysing the information shared by others 
(the baseline session lasted 50 minutes).  
In  this  experiment,  the  aggregate  level  of  sacrifices  in  the  last  5  periods 
( 187 . 0  mean , 025 . 0  SE ) was  again  significantly  below  that  of  the  baseline  experiment 
( 273 . 0  mean , 027 . 0  SE ; 126 . 2 ) 86 (  t , 034 . 0  P ). Compare Figure 1 (panel b) to Figure 
4.  At  17.9%  ( 024 . 0  SE ),  aggregate  sacrifices,  however,  were  the  same  in  the  last  five 
periods of this experiment as they were when we labelled the uncertainty as „the weather‟ in 
experiment  3  ( 187 . 0  mean , 025 . 0  SE ; 219 . 0 ) 83 (   t , 827 . 0  P ).  If  we  then  look  at 
individual levels, we find that 62.3% of participants sacrificed more than 10% of their Phase I 
holdings  of  the  good  in  the  last  five  periods.  This  means  that  the  vast  majority  kept  on 
sacrificing large amounts even though they had access to an average of about 250 sacrifice-
award observations. 
These information experiments are the clearest indication that learning from the experience of 
others, although it is certainly present, is extremely slow. Aggregate sacrifices in a round 
remain tightly anchored to the initial belief, even after 200 sacrifice-award observations. A 
tempting hypothesis is that many individuals simply do not bother to put in the effort to learn 
about the actual reciprocity of the unknown and instead trust their prior on this. Indeed, one 
could see this during the experiments: typically about 3 or 4 out of the 20 would stare at their 
screens to try and work out what was going on whilst the majority quickly made up their 
minds, only glancing at the additional information provided to them. It may of course be true 
that there was simply not enough at stake for most participants to bother to update their initial 
beliefs by analysing new information, though we may here already foreshadow that those few 16 
 
participants who spent more time analysing the data did not sacrifice significantly less (see 
next section).  
 
4.4 Robustness treatments   
We ran additional treatments to test particular alternative hypotheses concerning sacrifices 
(see Table 2). Our main concern was whether our results were an artefact of our design. In 
total, some 187 students were involved in these experiments. Briefly described, the robustness 
experiments tackled the following questions: 
-  Are the Phase II results an artefact of the Phase I design? One might argue that Phase I 
primes individuals to expect Theoi to be human and reciprocal because Phase I was 
itself related to reciprocity. In order to investigate this, we ran 4 more sessions on 72 
subjects  in  which  Phase  I  was  replaced  by  simple  mathematical  tests  via  which 
individuals  could  earn  units.  These  mathematical  tests  consisted  of  five  sums  of 
positive, 1-digit numbers;  fours sums of positive, 2-digit numbers;  and 3 sums of 
positive, 3-digit numbers. In total, subject where presented with these 12 sums at the 
same time and they had 45 seconds to answer as many as they could. Each correct 
answer will award the subject 20 tokens (units of the good). In addition, 20 more 
tokens were given to each subject to avoid having subjects starting Phase II with no 
tokens. Table 2 (robustness treatment 1) shows the other details of this treatment. On 
average  for  all  sessions  and  periods,  subjects  solved  6.36  (SD=1.75)  problems 
correctly,  which  gave  them  an  average  of  Phase  I‟s  units  of  the  good  of  147.25 
(SD=34.99). The level of this Phase I outcome is similar to the units obtained by 
participants in all other sessions where Phase I consisted of the public good game with 
the Voluntary Contribution Scheme (the average was 121.56, SD=31.46). The profile 
of sacrifice does not change when compared to the baseline treatment, and as was the 17 
 
case in the baseline treatment, subjects sacrificed around 30% of their holdings from 
Phase I (mean = 0.322; clustered SE=0.027 ) in the last five periods. 
-  Would individuals sacrifice less if they were prompted a low amount? In order to 
investigate  this,  we  added  a  default  level  of  sacrifice  equal  to  10%  that  would 
automatically appear on the screen. Hence individuals had to remove the 10% and 
enter a different amount if they did not want to sacrifice 10%. Again, this made no 
difference to the level or profile of the sacrifices, implying that the average participant 
indeed actively removed the prompted amount and substituted it with higher amounts. 
In the last five periods the average sacrificed was 23.8% (clustered SE=0.063). 
-  Would it help if there was actually a negative \ positive feedback between sacrifices 
and outcome? In order to investigate this possibility, we varied Theoi‟s decision rule. 
In one session we allowed a positive association between sacrificing unit to Theoi and 
the  unit  vale.  Specifically,  if  the  subject  sacrificed  something,  his  unit  value  was 
determined by 1 plus a random number uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. On the 
other hand, if the subject sacrificed nothing, his unit value was determined by 1 minus 
a random number uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 (see  Table 2, robustness 
treatment 3).  In another session, there was a negative association between sacrifice 
and unit value. If the subject sacrificed something, it would receive a negative random 
shock to the unit value, and if he decided to sacrifice nothing, then a positive random 
shock would affect his unit value in a similar fashion to the positive association case 
just  described  (see  Table  2,  robustness  treatment  4).  In  this  case  we  found  that 
individuals sacrificed more on average when the correlation was negative and less 
when it was positive, exactly opposite to what one would expect from a rational point 
of view. However, only twelve subjects participated in each of these two sessions, and 
hence, results should be taken with caution.  18 
 
-  The next hypothesis we wished to test was whether having sacrifices to a single source 
provided a benefit to the group as a whole. In our context, this meant we wondered 
whether the contribution to the public good made in Phase I would be higher with 
sacrifices than if there was no option to sacrifice (see Table 2, treatment 6). To this 
end, we simply performed 3 sessions with 49 subjects in total who played Phase I but 
not Phase II. Unit values were still subject to the random shocks but individuals were 
merely  informed  of  these  shocks  without  having  a  sacrifice  option.  We  find  that 
aggregate contributions to the public good are slightly lower without sacrifices than 
they are with sacrifices in the last 5 periods. The aggregate contribution is 41.91, 
which is not significantly different at the 10% level from the average of 45.78 of the 
baseline experiment. Hence, our individualised option to sacrifice has no discernible 






5.  Individual determinants of sacrifices 
 
At the end of each experiment we asked individuals to give us their personal characteristics, 
including their level of religiosity, their health, and their incomes. The sample averages for all 
experiments combined are reported in Table 2. We run simple Tobit models on the individual 
determinants of the proportion sacrificed in Table 3. 
The  columns  in  Table  3  gradually  add  more  variables,  such  that  columns  3  and  7  show 
„kitchen sink regressions‟. The difference between the columns 1 to 3 and the columns 4 to 7 
is  that  the  later  columns  also  include  interactions  between  the  period  number  and  the 
variables.  
 
In the first specification, all that are included are 4 variables capturing the time-profile (the 
inverse of the period and 3 time dummies following the negative shocks) and the contribution 
to the public good game in Phase I. Apart from these variables, all specifications include 
dummies for the type of treatment.  
 
In the first column, we see that a large part of the initial sacrifice (0.2287) is predicted to 
eventually go to zero as the number of periods tends to infinity. This part is almost half of the 
initial sacrifice. This fraction goes down as more variables are added over the columns, such 
that in the „kitchen sink‟ regression of column 7, only 0.11 of the initial level of sacrifice is 
predicted to go to zero. The results in the first column also reveal no effect of the two later 
„negative shock periods 11 and 16‟, though there is a significant positive increase in sacrifices 
after the first major negative shock, i.e. the level of sacrifice in period 6 is 0.05 higher than 
otherwise predicted. The importance of the level of contributions in the first period is also 
shown to be great: an individual contributing 100% to the initial public good game sacrifices 
a 0.39 fraction more than an individual who sacrifices nothing in the initial public good game. 
This  indicates  that  the  expectation  of  reciprocity  may  indeed  be  a  strong  individual 
personality trait. 
 
Looking at the effect of other variables in the subsequent columns, we find that the older 
significantly sacrifice more which echoes the usual finding for normal religious behaviour 
(Iannaconne 1998). Interestingly, the level of own reported religiosity has no marked effect on 20 
 
the  level  of  sacrifice,  suggesting  that  religious  tendencies  are  not  confined  to  recognised 
religion. We also see, surprisingly, that students of engineering and IT sacrifice significantly 
more, whilst students of economics sacrifice just as much as the default (mainly arts and 
business).  
 
Variables that pick up an individual‟s stated degree of superstition (measured by the belief in 
good luck charms), marital status, and satisfaction with finances or life, have no significant 
impact on the level of sacrifice.  
 
In column 4 we see that the interaction between period and the level of contributions in the 
first Phase is significantly negative, which indicates that individuals contributing more in the 
first Phase more strongly reduce their contributions over time, which makes sense as they 
contributed more to begin with. From the interactions in column 5 to 7, we see that females 
significantly  increase  their  contributions  over  time  relative  to  men,  that  those  with  lucky 
charms significantly reduce their contributions over time, and that those with a high locus of 
control significantly reduce their sacrifices over time. Unexpectedly, those who take more 
time to decide on how much to sacrifice to Theoi significantly increase their contributions 
over time compared to those who decide more quickly. One interpretation of these findings is 
that men, those with good luck charms, with high locus of control, and those who take little 
time in deciding, are the ones who learn faster about the non-reciprocity of Theoi. It is the 
case that these interactions combined are significant. 
 
The most salient finding in this table remains the coefficient on the contribution made to the 
public  good.  This  is  highly  positive,  indicating  that  reciprocity  towards  the  public  good 
complements rather than substitutes for expected reciprocity towards the unknown. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we found that individuals sacrifice towards a source of economic uncertainty and 
that they sacrifice more when the uncertainty is higher and when it has a human name. Our 
interpretation  is  that,  when  faced  with  an  incomprehensible  phenomenon,  individuals 
anthropomorphise the unknown (Boyer 2008). They could do this because the unknown is 21 
 
seen as powerful and hence necessarily „at least equal to‟ humans. A variant of this hypothesis 
is that humanising the unknown is the quickest mental strategy available that requires less 
mental effort than close observation of the unknown and its actions. The unknown would then 
be  presumed  to  be  reciprocal  because  humans  are  often  reciprocal.  This  extends  the 
arguments about the innate reciprocity of humans to the realm of the metaphysical (Fehr & 
Fischbacher 2003; Croson 2007).  
One interesting strand of future research is the notion of lock-in mechanisms. Intermediaries 
who control the information provided to the population about the source of uncertainty might 
be  instrumental  in  transforming  sacrifices  that  start  as  bargains  with  the  unknown  into 
elaborate religions. It is also possible that sacrificing towards the unknown gives a direct 
intrinsic  reward  in  the  form  of  stress-relief,  as  if  giving  the  unknown  „its  due‟  makes 
individuals feel they have squared an internal mental balance (Dennett 2006; Newberg & Lee 
2005). The importance of such competing lock-in mechanisms for the persistence of religion 
seems a promising next step in the search for economic explanations of modern-day religions. 
Suppose the train of thought in this paper holds. In what way does the emerging view of 
religion then differ from the current view in the economics of religion? For the most part, our 
views fit snugly with most of those of Iannaconne and Berman (2006). Organised religion, 
which minimally includes an intermediary role between the innate wish for certainty and the 
ultimate suppliers (the reciprocal supernatural entities), would itself constitute a rent and be 
susceptible to the usual market forces. The story of religion would itself be mainly guided by 
whatever sources of uncertainty populations experience and thus economic „fundamentals‟ 
would  have  the  primacy,  just  as  in  the  theories  of  Lewis  (1955).  As  in  Iannaconne  and 
Berman (2006), sects and religious organisations would be rival providers of public goods 
(imaginary or true) and religions would be predicted to lessen in levels of activity and fervour 
if secular states would provide more public goods.  22 
 
Where our view subtly differs is that it is predictive of the content of religion by giving 
reasons for the actual religious stories doing the rounds, bound as they are by sources of 
important  uncertainty.  Indeed,  our  view  is  predictive  of  new  religions  as  new  sources  of 
uncertainty are recognised and played out in the media, such as uncertainty in global climate 
patterns. Not only do we provide a predictive story for new religions, but we furthermore do 
not  rely  on  religious  stories  to  be  pre-commitment  devices  for  other  things  of  actual 
importance, such as providing sufficient work effort which is the essence of the Benabou and 
Tirole (2004) models and other models of the afterlife as a pre-commitment device to do what 
is already in one‟s own interest (e.g. Ahmed and Salas 2009). In our view, to sacrifice is not 
in one‟s own rational material interests, unless of course the uncertain truly is reciprocal. 
Where our study strongly differs is in the interpretation of sacrifices, which Iannaconne and 
Berman  (2006)  interpret  as  entry-barriers  that  help  enforce  high  public  goods  provisions 
within small clubs.  Instead we interpret sacrifices as part of the direct  trade between the 
unknown  and  individuals,  a  trade  that  is  capable  of  surviving  even  in  the  absence  of 
communities  or  other  outside  benefits.  Our  individual-level  experiments  were  set  up  to 
discount community benefits of sacrifices, and to us it does not really seem to make much 
sense to view sacrifices as club-entry devices. If religious clubs indeed have a need for entry 
barriers, then why would they include sacrifices which only have costs to both individuals and 
the community (such as suicides or the burning of food)? Rather, wouldn‟t it make more 
sense to have individuals observably sacrifice their time to observable public goods, as many 
religious communities indeed do in the form of charity to the poor? Other forms of entry 
barriers are equally easy to think of, implying that our theory views sacrifices as innate to the 
production of certain religious goods. This doesn‟t mean however that there is no relationship 
between  sacrifices  and  entry  barriers.  Precisely  because  individuals  are  prone  to  believe 
sacrifices work, visible true sacrifices do flag adherence to beliefs and thereby confer value as 
a  means  of  screening  out  the  less-believing.  However,  the  primacy  here  is  the  religious 
content and the level of uncertainty facing a community. The possibility that a sect could 23 
 
overcome the uncertainty in some spheres (education, health, child care) is secondary: there 
would be a high level of demand to sacrifice anyway in situations of high uncertainty. 24 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
 Table 1.  Description of main treatments  
 
Treatment  Description  Individual Shock  Group Shock 
Unit Value  
of the Good (UV)
(a) 
Income in each Period 
(in experimental units) 
Sessions  Participants 
1. Baseline 
Unit value of the good 
is determined randomly 




in the interval [0,1) 
Random number 
distributed uniform in 
the interval [0,1). In 
periods 5, 10, and 15 
group shock equals 0.5. 
1 + Ind. Shock + Group Shock  UV*(Holding PI - Sacrifice)  4  56 
2. No effect  Unit value of the good 
is fixed at $1 and 
sacrifice has no effect. 
None  None  1  UV*(Holding PI - Sacrifice)  4  65 
3. The 
Weather 
Unit value of the good 
is determined randomly 
and sacrifice has no 
effect. “Theoi” is 




in the interval [0,1) 
Random number 
distributed uniform in 
the interval [0,1). In 
periods 5, 10, and 15 
group shock equals 0.5. 
1 + Ind. Shock + Group Shock  UV*(Holding PI - Sacrifice)  2  32 
4. Share info 
Unit value of the good 
is determined randomly 
and sacrifice has no 
effect, but each 
participant can reveal 
their contribution to 
Theoi and the unit 
value they obtain. 
Random number 
distributed uniform 
in the interval [0,1). 
Random number 
distributed uniform in 
the interval [0,1). In 
periods 5, 10, and 15 
group shock equals 0.5. 
1 + Ind. Shock + Group Shock  UV*(Holding PI - Sacrifice)  3  53 
 
Notes:   
* This description does not include the Part I of each treatment which is the Public Good game. Part I is exactly the same for all four treatments. 
(a) Given the characteristics of the individual and group shock it is possible to randomly obtain a negative value for the Unit Value. To avoid this, the specific formula used was: 
)     1 , 0 max(   Shock Group Shock Ind Value Unit    . 
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Table 2.  Description of robustness treatments 
Treatment  Description  Individual Shock  Group Shock  Unit Value  
of the Good (UV)
(a) 
Income in each Period 
(in experimental units)  Sessions  Subjects 
1. Different 
Phase I game 
As baseline, but in Phase I subjects 
had to solve as many arithmetic 
problems as they could in 45 sec. 




in the interval [0,1) 
Random number 
distributed uniform in the 
interval [0,1). In periods 5, 
10, and 15 group shock 
equals 0.5. 
1 + Ind. Shock + 
Group Shock 
UV*(Holding PI - Sacrifice)  4  72 
2. Default 
sacrifice (10%) 
As baseline, but at the beginning of 
Phase II, there is a default 10% 
sacrifice in the box. This amount 




in the interval [0,1) 
Random number 
distributed uniform in the 
interval [0,1). In periods 5, 
10, and 15 group shock 
equals 0.5. 
1 + Ind. Shock + 
Group Shock 





Unit value is shocked positively if 
subject sacrifice something, and 
shocked negatively if subject 
sacrifice nothing.  
Random number 
distributed uniform 
in the interval [0,1). 




distributed uniform in the 
interval [0,1). In periods 5, 
10, and 15 group shock 
equals 0.5. 
1 + Ind. Shock + 
Group Shock 





Unit value is shocked negatively if 
subject sacrifice something, and 




in the interval [0,1). 




distributed uniform in the 
interval [0,1). In periods 5, 
10, and 15 group shock 
equals 0.5. 
1 + Ind. Shock + 
Group Shock 
UV*(Holding PI - Sacrifice)  1  12 
5. Reveal only 
best positive 
outcome 
As baseline, but before final result 
for period is shown, there is a 
screen showing the units sacrificed 
and the unit value obtained for the 
person with the highest ratio 
between these two variables. 
Random number 
distributed uniform 
in the interval [0,1) 
Random number 
distributed uniform in the 
interval [0,1). In periods 5, 
10, and 15 group shock 
equals 0.5. 
1 + Ind. Shock + 
Group Shock 
UV*(Holding PI - Sacrifice)  2  27 
6. No option to 
sacrifice to 
Theoi 
As baseline, but in Phase II subject 
has no option to sacrifice to Theoi.   
Random number 
distributed uniform 
in the interval [0,1) 
Random number 
distributed uniform in the 
interval [0,1). In periods 5, 
10, and 15 group shock 
equals 0.5. 
1 + Ind. Shock + 
Group Shock 
UV*(Holding PI - Sacrifice)  3  49 Table 3.  Descriptive statistics of variables in the Tobit models 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Contribution to PG game  33.731  (33.293)  0.00  100.00 
1/period  .180  (0.218)  0.05  1.00 
Time deciding sacrifice to Theoi  15.744  (7.004)  1.00  129.00 
Dummy Period 6  .050  (0.218)  0.00  1.00 
Dummy Period 11  .050  (0.218)  0.00  1.00 
Dummy Period 16  .050  (0.218)  0.00  1.00 
Female  .476  (0.499)  0.00  1.00 
Australian  .459  (0.498)  0.00  1.00 
Age  23.208  (5.484)  17.00  52.00 
Has a lucky charm  .268  (0.443)  0.00  1.00 
Belive someone watches over them  .553  (0.497)  0.00  1.00 
Index: Good luck charms bring good luck  2.707  (1.161)  1.00  5.00 
How often person goes to church  4.379  (1.609)  1.00  6.00 
Relative socio-economic status  2.194  (0.567)  1.00  3.00 
Dummy for economists and finance students  .735  (0.441)  0.00  1.00 
Dummy for Engineering/IT students  .177  (0.381)  0.00  1.00 
English is main language  .567  (0.496)  0.00  1.00 
Locus of control index  13.336  (3.476)  7.00  22.00 
Satisfaction with financial situation (1-10)  5.091  (2.451)  1.00  10.00 
Satisfaction with all thing in life  3.729  (0.902)  1.00  5.00 
Married  .333  (0.471)  0.00  1.00 









Table 4.  Proportion of Phase I sacrificed to Theoi, Tobit results. 
Variable  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
Contribution to PG game  .0039  .0038  .0038  .0044  .0038  .0038  .0037 
  (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0003)  (.0004)  (.0004)  (.0004) 
1/period  .2287  .2325  .2320  .1892  .1334  .1265  .1110 
  (.0245)  (.0216)  (.0246)  (.0216)  (.0217)  (.0246)  (.0258) 
Dummy Period 6  .0501  .0513  .0512  .0425  .0257  .0235  .0215 
  (.0140)  (.0132)  (.0137)  (.0136)  (.0140)  (.0141)  (.0139) 
Dummy Period 11  .0038  .0038  .0038  .0034  -.0027  -.0033  -.0021 
  (.0129)  (.0123)  (.0127)  (.0130)  (.0128)  (.0124)  (.0134) 
Dummy Period 16  -.0184  -.0190  -.0190  -.0127  -.0019  -.0005  -.0032 
  (.0112)  (.0111)  (.0114)  (.0103)  (.0104)  (.0097)  (.0106) 
Female    .0238  .0266    -.0121  -.0222  -.0194 
    (.0225)  (.0221)    (.0254)  (.0269)  (.0276) 
Australian    .0248  .0225    .0011  .0061  .0077 
    (.0293)  (.0292)    (.0341)  (.0322)  (.0335) 
Age    .0038  .0035    .0049  .0030  .0031 
    (.0016)  (.0019)    (.0018)  (.0019)  (.0019) 
Has a lucky charm    -.0297  -.0304    .0165  .0199  .0213 
    (.0248)  (.0249)    (.0282)  (.0289)  (.0292) 
Belief that someone watches over them    .0144  .0128    -.0089  -.0157  -.0148 
    (.0219)  (.0222)    (.0258)  (.0259)  (.0261) 
Index: Good luck charms bring good luck    .0182  .0189    .0217  .0165  .0174 
    (.0107)  (.0105)    (.0127)  (.0120)  (.0120) 
How often person goes to church    -.0038  -.0044    -.0047  -.0080  -.0071 
    (.0065)  (.0065)    (.0068)  (.0072)  (.0071) 
Relative socio-economic status    -.0301  -.0316    -.0263  -.0371  -.0335 
    (.0180)  (.0194)    (.0202)  (.0213)  (.0205) 
Dummy for economists/finance students    .0036  .0027    .0510  .0299  .0319 
    (.0308)  (.0314)    (.0398)  (.0430)  (.0393) 
Dummy for Engineering/IT students    .0960  .0965    .1229  .0924  .0956 
    (.0346)  (.0348)    (.0438)  (.0490)  (.0464) 
English is main language    -.0434  -.0465    -.0380  -.0490  -.0421 
    (.0299)  (.0312)    (.0328)  (.0373)  (.0373) 
Locus of control index      -.0020      .0038  .0046 
      (.0033)      (.0036)  (.0035) 
Satisfaction with financial situation (1-10)      .0004      -.0013  -.0010 
      (.0044)      (.0053)  (.0052) 
Satisfaction with all thing in life      -.0064      .0076  .0103 
      (.0117)      (.0146)  (.0142) 
Married      .0108      .0152  .0129 
      (.0232)      (.0262)  (.0277) 
Time deciding sacrifice to Theoi              .0014 
              (.0012) 32 
 
Constant  .0735  .0009  .0586  .0803  .0220  .0810  .0052 
  (.0124)  (.0782)  (.1080)  (.0137)  (.0787)  (.1142)  (.1117) 
Table 4.  Proportion of Phase I sacrificed to Theoi (continued) 
 
Variable  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
Contribution to PG game        -.0001  -.0000  -.0000  -.0000 
        (.0000)  (.0000)  (.0000)  (.0000) 
Female          .0035  .0047  .0045 
          (.0019)  (.0020)  (.0019) 
Australian          .0023  .0016  .0016 
          (.0024)  (.0025)  (.0024) 
Age          -.0001  .0001  -.0000 
          (.0001)  (.0001)  (.0001) 
Has a lucky charm          -.0045  -.0049  -.0051 
          (.0022)  (.0023)  (.0021) 
Belief that someone watches over them          .0023  .0028  .0028 
          (.0020)  (.0018)  (.0019) 
Index: Good luck charms bring good luck          -.0003  .0002  .0002 
          (.0009)  (.0009)  (.0009) 
How often person goes to church          .0001  .0004  .0004 
          (.0005)  (.0006)  (.0005) 
Relative socio-economic status          -.0004  .0005  .0004 
          (.0014)  (.0014)  (.0014) 
Dummy for economists and finance 
students          -.0046  -.0026  -.0027 
          (.0025)  (.0026)  (.0026) 
Dummy for Engineering/IT students          -.0026  .0003  -.0003 
          (.0026)  (.0031)  (.0031) 
English is main language          -.0006  .0002  -.0002 
          (.0024)  (.0026)  (.0027) 
Locus of control index            -.0006  -.0006 
            (.0002)  (.0002) 
Satisfaction with financial situation (1 to 
10)            .0002  .0002 
            (.0004)  (.0004) 
Satisfaction with all thing in life            -.0013  -.0016 
            (.0010)  (.0009) 
Married            -.0005  -.0000 
            (.0021)  (.0020) 
Time deciding sacrifice to Theoi              .0004 
              (.0001) 
               
Number of observations  7020  7020  7020  7020  7020  7020  7020 
Sigma  .2953  .2925  .2923  .2949  .2913  .2908  .2897 
Pseudo R2  .2575  .2915  .2924  .2596  .3027  .3063  .3170 
Standard errors in parentheses. 33 
 
Figure 1. Average investment to group project and proportion  
of Phase I’s earnings contributed to Theoi 
 
Notes:  
(a) Average investment to the group project. This treatment was applied in 4 sessions. A total of 56 individuals 
participated  in  these  sessions.  Shaded  grey  regions  show  the  95%  normal  confidence  intervals.  
(b)  Average  contribution  to  Theoi  as  a  proportion  of  Phase  I  earnings.  In  this  treatment  the  unit  value  is 
determined as  )     1 , 0 max( shock group shock individual   . The group and individual shocks are drawn 
from  uniform  distributions  in  the  interval  ( -1,1).  In  periods  5,  10  and  15  the  group  sho ck  equals -0.5.  This 




Figure 2. Baseline versus no-uncertainty treatment 
 
Note: Average contribution to Theoi as a proportion of Phase I earnings. Shaded grey regions show the 95% 
normal confidence intervals. This treatment was applied in one session. A total of 17 individuals participated in 
this session. The average invested in the group project is not shown but is similar to the one in the baseline 
treatment. In this treatment the only source of uncertainty is the group shock, except in periods 5, 10 and 15 






Figure 3. Average sacrifice when uncertainty is high  




Average contribution to the weather as a proportion of Phase I earnings. Shaded grey regions show the 95% 
normal confidence intervals. In this treatment the unit value is determined as:  
)     1 , 0 max( shock group shock individual   . 
The group and individual shocks are drawn from uniform distributions in the interval (-1,1). In periods 5, 10 and 
15 the group shock equals -0.5. This treatment only differs from the baseline experiment in that individuals are 
given the option to sacrifice to “the weather” instead of sacrificing to Theoi. This treatment was applied in two 





Figure 4. Average sacrifice when uncertainty is high  




Average contribution to Theoi as a proportion of Phase I earnings. Shaded grey regions show the 95% normal 
confidence intervals. In this treatment the unit value is determined as: 
)     1 , 0 max( shock group shock individual   . 
The group and individual shocks are drawn from uniform distributions in the interval (-1,1). In periods 5, 10 and 
15 the group shock equals -0.5. This treatment differs from the baseline experiment, in that individuals  were 
allowed to reveal their absolute sacrifice to Theoi and the unit value they obtained to all other participants in the 
session. This treatment was applied in three sessions. A total of 53 individuals participated in these sessions. 37 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of the spread in sacrifices across individuals 
 
Notes: The Bandwidth is 0.05. 
 